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ABSTRACT 
Great Power Competition (GPC) pervades the U.S.–China relationship. However, 
the GPC dialog ignores the countries caught in between. While an ocean separates the 
United States and China, many nations in Asia sit next to China and worry about 
Beijing’s intentions. While some have strong conventional military forces to deter 
attacks, other nations do not have the same forces. Fortunately, Sweden and 
Singapore have defense concepts that lean on the entire society to contribute to 
defense. Both countries have Total Defense (TD) policies that complement 
traditional military forces. Both countries also purposely build defense cooperation. 
Sweden works with NATO, and Singapore has cooperation with the United Kingdom, 
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and the United States. Integrating the whole 
population into homeland defense and enhancing defense cooperation increase the cost 
and risk of invasion for any attacker. The risks may even be enough to prevent war. 
Given Sweden and Singapore’s experience, this thesis advocates that Vietnam and 
Taiwan develop TD or enhance existing TD plans, respectively, and that the United 
States support Vietnam and Taiwan in this endeavor. For Taiwan, U.S. assistance 
could guide the acquisition of weapons that have traditional and asymmetric use. The 
United States should also expand special operations cooperation with Taiwan to increase 
unconventional resistance capability. 
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As the world grapples with the Covid-19 pandemic’s social, economic, and political 
consequences, there is one geopolitical trend that continues to gain momentum. The United 
States and China continue to compete on the global stage. Despite the coronavirus’ threat 
to China and the U.S., cooperation against a common disease threat is unlikely to supplant 
global competition. The virus even worsened U.S. and Chinese relations. Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian accused the U.S. Army of bringing the disease to Wuhan. 
U.S. Senators Tom Cotton and Ted Cruz believe China created Covid-19, and it escaped 
from a Wuhan lab. Even Covid-19 vaccine development has added to the tension. On July 
21, 2020, the U.S. Justice Department accused China of deploying hackers to steal vaccine 
development data from U.S. labs.1 
Additionally, trade issues continue to plague U.S.-China relations. President 
Donald Trump has consistently criticized China for unfair business practices, intellectual 
property theft, and eliminating hundreds of thousands of jobs in the U.S. and Europe. 
Couple the coronavirus accusations with the ongoing trade disputes, and it is easy to see 
why relations continue to sour and great power competition gains momentum. The 2017 
U.S. National Defense Strategy states that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a threat, 
and the United States must confront PRC expansion.2 The PRC’s growth into the South 
China Sea, One Belt One Road initiative, and economic coercion signal the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) intention to assert influence beyond China’s borders. Given the 
contentious nature of relations, it is safe to assume the U.S. and China will compete for the 
foreseeable future. Yet, despite PRC attempts to challenge the United States’ superpower 
status, an ocean separates both nations. Although the PRC does possess nuclear weapons 
and continues to expand its power project capability, China is unlikely to attack the U.S. 
                                                 
1 Shayan Sardarizadeh and Olga Robinson, “China and the U.S. Trade Coronavirus Conspiracy 
Theories,” BBC News, last modified April 26, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-52224331. 
2 Jim Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2018), 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
2 
homeland because it would face similar retaliation. However, some of the countries closest 
to China cannot assume the same degree of security privileged to the United States. The 
smaller countries of Asia must live with the uncertainty associated with China’s increasing 
economic, political, and military strength. 
Often the great power competition dialog overlooks the smaller countries. Despite 
their relative size and power, smaller nations such as Vietnam and the island of Taiwan 
must protect interests and sovereignty. Nations that are smaller relative to large neighbors 
have to carefully maneuver foreign policy to avoid provoking or escalating conflict with 
powerful nations. It is a challenge for lesser powers. Fortunately, this challenge is not 
unique, and other countries have developed plans to maintain peace and prepare for war. 
Sweden and Singapore have plans to offset relative weakness. Envision an all you 
can eat buffet with every dish labeled according to its edibility. How many people would 
select the dish boldly labeled “Poison Shrimp” with a skull and crossbones graphic? The 
“Poison Shrimp” in the international relations realm are countries that harness the entire 
nation to defend the homeland. The consumable menu items are countries that neglect the 
power of the citizenry. Both Sweden and Singapore integrate the whole country in national 
security plans through a Total Defense (TD) policy. Sometimes referred to as a whole of 
government (WOG) or whole of society (WOS) approach to defense, TD policy attempts 
to deter conflict and prepare the population to resist aggression.3 As an umbrella for all 
activities and actions designed to protect the country, Total Defense preparations harness 
all facets of society to unite the nation in self-defense.4 Both Sweden and Singapore believe 
TD deters conflict by dramatically raising the cost of invasion. Any potential invader has 
to contend with the armed forces and civilian populace. 
Favorably for the United States, Total Defense policies open more opportunities to 
assist partner nations in enhancing defense capabilities and sharing the burden of upholding 
                                                 
3 Otto C Fiala, Resistance Operating Concept (Stockholm: Swedish Defense University, 2019), 
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-9007. 
4  “What Is Total Defense?,” Singapore Ministry of Defense, accessed August 25, 2020, 
https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/totaldefence/about.html. 
3 
international norms of sovereignty. The 2018 National Defense Strategy states explicitly 
that “With our allies and partners, we will challenge competitors by maneuvering them into 
unfavorable positions, frustrating their efforts, precluding their options while expanding 
our own, and forcing them to confront conflict under adverse conditions.”5 Given that U.S. 
policy is to support partners in their attempts to counter U.S. competitors, Total Defense is 
a natural avenue to increase U.S. cooperation. Since WOG policies are characteristically 
defensive and conducted within sovereign territory, the U.S. can complement host nation 
efforts to increase their resilience and resistance capability against an aggressor. Partner 
nations benefit from information exchanges, interoperability training, additional resources, 
and expertise. The U.S. benefits because the assistance is less escalatory than unilateral 
operations, and partner nations will become more self-sufficient and require less U.S. 
assistance overall. Enhanced interoperability with partner nations will streamline coalition 
operations if conflict breaks out. Total Defense reinforces international norms because self-
defense is an inherent right of all nations, big or small. It reaffirms a level playing field for 
all nations in international affairs by assisting other countries to improve security.  
Given the geopolitical context and background stated above, this thesis will seek to 
answer several questions. What are the key components of Sweden and Singapore’s total 
defense? If Vietnam and Taiwan enact TD, where do these countries rate regarding the key 
components of TD drawn from Sweden and Singapore? Finally, how can the U.S. support 
the development of TD in Vietnam and Taiwan? The thesis will review deterrence and 
escalation literature to establish the theoretical underpinning and risks associated with 
Total Defense policies. The paper then evaluates the key components of Sweden and 
Singapore’s total defense policies and uses the same TD components to assess Vietnam’s 
and Taiwan’s strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the paper will make recommendations on 
U.S. support to Vietnamese and Taiwanese TD efforts.  
Ultimately, this paper asserts that Total Defense can dissuade neighboring countries 
from invasion. Sweden and Singapore demonstrate that TD policies accomplish deterrence 
when society actively supports national defense, and existing international cooperation 
                                                 
5 Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 7. 
4 
facilitates possible friendly military intervention. Whole-of-society approaches enable all 
elements of society to support and complement traditional military capabilities since Total 
Defense provides the umbrella to coordinate the military and society. Societal integration 
is a vital component of the TD umbrella. International defense cooperation builds 
interoperability that increases the effectiveness of friendly military intervention. Sweden 
and Singapore provide a framework for Vietnam and Taiwan. Should Vietnam and Taiwan 
accomplish societal integration and international cooperation, total defense policies gain 
credibility and increase deterrence potential. Although Total Defense in Asia appears to be 
directed solely at China, the policy would protect any country from any invading neighbor 
or powerful nation. Some might perceive Total Defense policies as provocative. However, 
every country has the inherent right to defend its people with appropriate national policies. 
Self-defense is the unquestionable right of all nations. Total Defense supports smaller 
countries’ right to defend themselves from any threat or enemy.  
5 
II. DETERRENCE AND ESCALATION 
A. DETERRENCE 
Before looking into Total Defense policies, it is necessary to set the foundation for 
deterrence theory and its application in defense policies. In Lawrence Freeman’s work, 
General Deterrence and the Balance of Power, Freedman cites that “Deterrence is simply 
the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he 
might take outweigh the benefits.”6 Deterrence relies on influencing opponents to believe 
that specific actions will result in much more damage and pain to the aggressor and that 
any gain will be limited. It is important to emphasize that deterrence heavily relies on 
influence. For deterrence to work, a country must have effective military means to execute 
the appropriate actions, must exact unacceptable cost from the aggressor, and the attacker 
must believe that the defender will carry out the threat.7 Merely possessing the capability 
to damage an adversary is insufficient to secure deterrence. The adversary must accept that 
its attack will trigger severe consequences. For example, Winston Churchill professed his 
desire to protect every inch of the British Homeland from German invasion. This policy 
was communicated clearly and perceived as credible because militaries are supposed to 
defend home territory.8 However, Britain’s commitment to Poland’s defense was much 
less credible to Germany because it was a matter of policy and less about inherent self-
defense.9 Some threats are much more believable than others.  
Historical evidence supports Deterrence theory. In 1956, NATO had a choice. 
NATO could intervene in Hungary to thwart the Soviet Union’s attempts to control the 
country or simply let the Soviet Union continue its intervention policy. NATO decided 
                                                 
6 Lawrence Freedman, “General Deterrence and the Balance of Power,” Review of International 
Studies 15, no. 2, (1989): 200. 
7 Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?,” Review of International 
Studies 37, no. 2 (2011): 742. 
8 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 35. 
9 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 36. 
6 
against interfering with Soviet actions.10  Although NATO was more robust than the 
Soviet Union and would suffer less than the Soviets if it came to war, Moscow deterred the 
West from intervening in the dispute. NATO believed that the Soviet Union was willing 
and able to send its military against the West. NATO leadership did not question the 
USSR’s resolve or commitment to meet NATO military moves with Soviet forces. War 
was an unacceptable price. This assumption made it clear to NATO that the war’s cost was 
not worth Hungary’s independence.11 Hungary’s case illustrates that intent to defend and 
fight is paramount to deterrence’s credibility.  
The most famous example of deterrence emerged during the Cold War. Mutually 
Assured Destruction (MAD) entered the political science lexicon as the United States and 
the Soviet Union increased each other’s nuclear strike capabilities. Deterrence theorist 
Stephen Quackenbush wrote in Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand? That  
one might think policymakers would either have nerves of steel or brains of 
lead to launch a massive nuclear attack against a similarly armed adversary 
and expect the adversary would do nothing as it faces total destruction. After 
all, what leader would not retaliate in response to a nuclear attack? 12 
Deterrence rational in the nuclear age and today still is underpinned by the 
reasoning that nuclear retaliation will follow a nuclear attack, and the costs are too high for 
any side to take that step. There is no question about capability, and there is even less 
question about intent. It is a given that a nuclear state will use nuclear weapons to defend 
against nuclear attack, and therefore, deterrence works. Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons and knew that any atomic attack triggers atomic 
retaliation.13  
Given the basics of deterrence discussed above, it is essential to expound on the 
difference between general deterrence and immediate deterrence to clarify the type that this 
                                                 
10 Thomas C. Schelling, 36–37. 
11 Thomas C. Schelling, 37. 
12 Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?,” 751. 
13 Lawrence Freedman, “General Deterrence and the Balance of Power,” 204. 
7 
paper discusses. Freedman cites that, “Immediate deterrence concerns the relationship 
between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the 
other is mounting a threat of retaliation to prevent it. General deterrence relates to 
opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is 
anywhere near mounting an attack.”14 The difference between immediate and general 
breaks down to the timeframe. Immediate deterrence centers on specific moments when a 
state attempts to attack another country, and the defending government is trying to dissuade 
the attacker. General deterrence occurs when no state plans to go on the offensive, but both 
sides possess the capability to attack. These capabilities credibly deter conflict between the 
countries. To be clear, immediate deterrence is the deterrence this thesis explores. 
Currently, there are no pressing flashpoints in Asia that would describe immediate 
deterrence scenarios in Asia. Still, this paper imagines a hypothetical situation that requires 
a smaller country, dissuading a motivated aggressor. Although TD influences general 
deterrence, that discussion is beyond the scope of this writing.  
Although convincing, deterrence theory does have issues empirically proving its 
effectiveness. Deterrence relies on forcing an opponent to abstain from action. One can 
argue that deterrence works because the war did not happen. However, it is impossible to 
prove a negative occurrence because the evidence is negative. The evidence is the fact the 
event did not occur, and this leaves nothing to measure. Some can argue that a country 
never had any intention to attack in the first place, or the attacker was deterred for reasons 
utterly unrelated to the defender’s actions. Therefore, deterrence did not work.15 Both sides 
can look at the same outcome and arrive at completely different answers. This paper will 
assume that deterrence is possible and a viable policy decision.  
Deterrence centers on the defender’s capability to resist, the attacker understanding 
that a defender can inflict unacceptable cost, and the defender have every intention to fight. 
NATO’s decision to leave Hungary alone against the Soviet Union and the Cold War theme 
of mutually assured destruction reiterate the deterrence principles. The Soviet Union could 
                                                 
14 Freedman, “General Deterrence and the Balance of Power,” 202. 
15 Freedman, 201. 
8 
fight NATO and NATO believed the Soviet Union would use military force to exact 
terrible casualties on the West. NATO did not intervene in Hungary. The U.S. and the 
Soviet Union both had nuclear weapons, and both saw nuclear war as catastrophic and 
unacceptable. Both countries believed the other would retaliate with nuclear weapons.  
Total defense is effective if it addresses the main components of deterrence. TD 
capability must exist, carry the potential to derail an attacker’s objectives, and the attacker 
must believe TD will be employed. These elements restate deterrence principles in a total 
defense context, but it is useful because deterrence is the ultimate goal for any defender. 
Avoiding existential combat and maintaining sovereignty is preferable to war.  
B. ESCALATION 
To effectively assess Total Defense strategy, it is important to discuss the potential 
escalatory risks. Total Defense would be a liability if it triggered aggression from 
neighbors, and therefore TD must be assessed for possible misinterpretation.  
Escalation or Spiral theory debates the reasons why nations decide to go to war. 
This paper will use escalation and spiraling interchangeably. According to political 
scientist Robert Jervis, “the spiral model applies when the defender faces a status quo 
power, explains conflict as resulting fundamentally from the combination of international 
anarchy and the security dilemma…”16 Jervis describes the security dilemma as “these 
unintended and undesired consequences of actions meant to be defensive….. many of the 
means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others…. one 
state’s gain in security often inadvertently threatens others.” 17  States that attempt to 
improve security can make neighboring countries nervous and trigger reciprocal policies. 
If this cycle continues, then states may spiral towards war, which undermines everyone’s 
safety. Germany and England’s naval competition before World War One (WWI) 
illustrates spiraling from a historical perspective. 
                                                 
16 Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral 
and Deterrence Models,” World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 4, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010486. 
17 Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies 18, no. 3 
(September 18, 2009): 6, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903133050. 
9 
In 1908, Germany and England competed in a naval arms race. The German 
ambassador to England, Count Metternich, communicated to German leaders that, “Two 
different views are taken in England about the German Fleet. Once section of opinion holds 
that the fleet is being built for the purpose of attacking England…. the other view is that 
our fleet is not a deliberate threat of aggression but a possible danger to England.”18 
Metternich highlighted that although the German Navy was built to defend German 
interests, decision-makers in England can view the same fleet as a threat to English 
security. Ultimately history tells us that among many factors, English and German naval 
competition contributed to escalation between both nations and culminated in the initiation 
of WWI.  
With the basics of escalation and a historical example in hand, Total Defense should 
be evaluated according to its potential for escalation. Although the historical example and 
most literature concern arms such as battleships as the trigger for escalation, one can 
understand how a policy such as Total Defense can have a similar impact to a weapon of 
war. Although TD concerns the organization and preparation of a country’s resources for 
defense, the aggregate of actions may look like a weapon itself. The policy combats an 
aggressor with all non-lethal and lethal means. However, an arms race and comprehensive 
whole-of-society defense policy are different, and therefore its escalatory risk is different. 
Total defense does not require new or more weapons. The majority of spiral 
literature and security dilemma thought anchors on weaponry as the trigger for escalation. 
Charles Glaser writes that the unstable international world order necessitates the creation 
of militaries for national defense.19 Yet, this is the same military force that threatens 
neighboring states. Similarly, Andrew Kydd highlights that an arms buildup sends an 
aggressive signal to surrounding nations, which initiates a reciprocating arms buildup.20 
Fortunately, the tradeoff between building more military capability to protect the country 
or leaving the country unprotected is a false dichotomy. There are more options to defend 
                                                 
18 Andrew Kydd, “Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” World Politics 49, no. 3 (1997): 2. 
19 Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy,” 12.  
20 Kydd, “Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” 2. 
10 
a country than merely producing more tanks, artillery, ships, or planes. Total Defense is an 
alternative to a massive arms production policy. 
Total Defense’s whole-of-nation principles focus on employing domestic capability 
uniquely and not simply developing new lethal capabilities. Actions such as preparing the 
population to withstand hardship or defending the towns and villages are not provocative. 
It is reasonable for anyone to understand why another person would protect one’s family 
and home. It is the basic need for safety. Storing canned food, bottled water, medicine, and 
batteries would be useful in a natural disaster or crisis. Civil preparations help the military 
by freeing up resources and manpower to focus on fighting, but this abstract connection to 
military force would be a dubious reason to escalate to war. The preparations have 
legitimate non-military purposes during peacetime. Even when the civil practices and 
popular mobilization support the military during the war, this is just the necessary actions 
of a state attempting to defend its sovereignty. The international community is more likely 
to condemn the aggressor state than the citizens and government trying to protect the 
homeland.21  
It is also important to highlight that this paper will focus on the relationship between 
smaller nations and aspiring hegemonic nations. Countries with military parity and 
relatively equal national power may initiate uncontrolled escalation if one side embarks on 
Total Defense. As mentioned earlier by Jervis, the spiral model applies to a defender and 
status quo power.22 The status quo implies a stable system that all states follow. However, 
the issue of escalation among equal states needs further research. This writing’s primary 
concern will be on the adoption of Total Defense by smaller nations in relation to larger, 
more powerful neighbors. There is certainly the possibility that a smaller nation’s attempts 
to deter an expansionist aggressor may provoke a conflict. A defender’s military policies 
may make an aggressor feel insecure and spur the attacker to carry out military action to 
                                                 
21 Otto C Fiala, Resistance Operating Concept (Stockholm: Swedish Defense University, 2019): 18 
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-9007. 
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guarantee safety.23 These discussions center on pure military policies, and Total Defense 
relies on population, government, and military coordination over weapons buildup and 
therefore is less provocative than military means of defense.  
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III. TOTAL DEFENSE POLICY 
This paper has touched on Total Defense in discussions on deterrence, but it is 
necessary to describe further what is Total Defense. Describing TD serves two purposes. 
First, Total Defense may have a different meaning to different people, so it is important to 
understand how this paper uses TD. Secondly, by using Sweden and Singapore as the 
benchmarks, this section also demonstrates the all-inclusive and whole-of-society 
foundation of both country’s TD policy. National integration in national defense is one of 
the components this paper argues is necessary for TD to deter an aggressor. To narrow the 
paper’s argument and provide a common reference for comparing different Total Defense 
efforts worldwide, this paper has selected Swedish and Singaporean TD policies as the 
baseline to guide other countries. The Swedish have a long history of independence. Even 
during World War Two, Sweden avoided war with both the Allied and Axis powers.24 
Sweden does not possess nuclear weapons and is not a member of NATO. Although 
Sweden does cooperate with NATO and continues public debate on possible NATO 
member status, Sweden is not a NATO member, and significant segments of the population 
still believe that military non-alignment is vital for Sweden’s neutrality.25 It is worth 
noting that Sweden has avoided war and effectively maintained sovereignty over its 
territory despite its proximity to Russia and NATO alliance countries.  
Looking at Singapore, the city-state is useful for comparison because it is located 
in Asia, does not have a mutual security treaty with any country, and does not have nuclear 
weapons. Although Singapore does cooperate with the United Kingdom, Malaysia, 
Australia, and New Zealand in the Five Powers Defense Agreement(FPDA) framework, 
the FPDA is not a security alliance and does not guarantee military intervention to support 
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any member.26 Although other nations may come to Singapore’s defense, this paper will 
assume that external military intervention on Singapore’s behalf is not certain or beyond 
doubt.  
Swedish and Singaporean traits are important because many countries in Asia 
cannot rely on a security alliance or nuclear weapons to dissuade aggressors. These 
countries must possess domestic deterrence capability.  
Given Swedish and Singaporean Total Defense policy merits, the next task is to 
explore the TD concept. Total Defense can be summarized as: 
According to Swedish law, total defense is defined as the preparations and 
planning required to prepare Sweden for war. When the government has 
declared highest alert, all societal functions are defined as total defence, 
which consists of military defence and civil defence. In accordance, the 
Parliament, the Government, government authorities, municipalities, 
private enterprises, voluntary defence organizations as well as individuals 
are all part of the total defence.27  
Singapore espouses similar visions of TD. According to Singapore’s Total Defense 
website, “Total Defense involves every Singaporean playing a part, individually and 
collectively, to build a strong, secure and cohesive nation. When we are strong, we are able 
to deal with any crisis.”28  
TD requires the mustering of all the resources and people of a country to effectively 
deter and resist an attacker. The perceived threat necessitates the all-encompassing nature 
of TD, WOG, or WOS policies. Smaller nations may face opponents that have larger 
landmass and population, possess more capable and numerous military assets, and harbor 
expansionist ambitions. If these neighbors have hegemonic intent, then the aspiring 
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aggressor is a severe threat to a smaller nation’s sovereignty.29 Some countries address this 
dilemma with security alliances or nuclear weapons. However, if security pacts and nuclear 
weapons are unacceptable or feasible, Total Defense provides another option to protect a 
nation’s sovereignty.  
A. SWEDEN’S TD CONCEPT 
The main components of Sweden’s Total Defense policy are resilience and 
resistance activities. Resilience concerns “the will and ability to withstand external 
pressure and influences and/or recover from the effects of those pressures or influences.”30 
To build up the people to withstand attacks, the government must invest time and resources 
to prepare the population for hardship. This investment will pay off when the government 
asks its people to resist. Resistance is “a nation’s organized, whole-of-society effort, 
encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally 
established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish 
independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially 
occupied by a foreign power.”31 It is important to note that resistance occurs once a foreign 
power has commenced hostility and has intervened inside the homeland. The definition is 
intentionally broad because it attempts to encapsulate any government, military, and citizen 
activities to undermine an attacker. Although both elements have distinct timeframes for 
execution, both resilience and resistance activities are interrelated and supporting. Both 
resilience and resistance components will be elaborated on in the following sections. 
1. Resilience Phase 
Resilience will be broken into several sections to help organize the actions that must 
take place. These sections are military, government, and population activities. There are 
undoubtedly many different ways to frame the discussion, but the military, government, 
and population activities cover the main topics. 
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During the resiliency phase, the military supports the creation of resistance 
organizations. It is a given that the military has to be ready to fight and defend the country. 
That is the widely accepted responsibility of national armies worldwide; therefore, the 
military’s traditional function will not be the center of discussion. Consequently, the 
military’s focus in the WOS defense preparation is to guide resistance organizations’ 
development. This task is more difficult since resistance organizations should not have 
personnel with traditional military or government roles to avoid targeting by the 
occupier. 32  Nonetheless, resistance organizations are essential to thwarting occupiers 
because they continue to subvert and undermine an occupier’s authority. The different 
activities will be discussed in the resistance section.  
The military’s involvement is pivotal because it is best suited to recruiting, training, 
and equipping the various groups that form the nation’s resistance force. Medical training, 
logistics, basic soldiering, and force protection are skills the military can impart to 
civilians. Additionally, the military can help identify the leaders that will be the core cadre 
directing resistance.33 Resistance leaders will be responsible for eventually synchronizing 
communication, personnel, intelligence, and supplies for the nation’s defense. The skills, 
purpose, and structures of resistance organizations are numerous. They cover many defense 
aspects, but the key takeaway for militaries regarding resilience is massive investment in 
preparing and creating civilian organizations before conflict erupts. Figure 1 below 
provides an example of organizational structure for resistance organizations. These 
organizations can continue to support friendly military operations and actively frustrate an 
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Figure 1. Pre-conflict, cadre-led, partial, resistance organization sample.34 
For example, if people lack national identity, the government must enact domestic 
projects to unify them. Admittedly, the concept of national identity can be complex, 
contentious, and difficult to define or navigate for many countries. This paper only focuses 
on unity as a necessary prerequisite for effective whole of society defense. A cohesive 
society enhances resilience and motivation to resist.35 To enhance the nation’s identity, the 
government could initiate patriotic education, increase integration of minority groups, and 
identify shared values that can improve the population’s interconnectedness. Psychological 
preparations can also enhance national identity as well. Building a popular narrative of 
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what it means to be a citizen and how one can unite in the face of hardship will ultimately 
prepare the people to oppose enemy efforts to manipulate the population.  
Civilian governments should also practice the procedures and mechanisms to 
manage a crisis. Whether it is a human-made or natural disaster, crisis management helps 
exercise society’s necessary functions during duress periods.36 Planning for resistance 
should incorporate all sectors of government. Emergency exercises that test the 
government, civil defense, and resistance structures should take place frequently and well 
in advance of an expected outbreak of hostilities. Crisis preparation combined with 
psychological and patriotic hardening offers government action examples to support 
national resilience and preparation for resistance.  
The final component of the resilience phase of TD is the general population. The 
general population has to prepare, practice, and implement total defense at the individual 
and family level. The government and military will direct and inform the populace as best 
as possible, but it will be the citizens who decide the nation’s fate when faced with an 
existential threat. To build a broad understanding of the population’s contributions to 
resilience, the discussion looks at active citizens who have to resist actively and those that 
will resist occupiers passively. Both require considerable preparation before conflict to 
successfully undermine an aggressor’s manipulation. 
The majority of the general population has to prepare to resist an occupier 
passively. Passive resistance incorporates many nonviolent means of resistance, such as 
poor work performance, ignoring new regulations, and transmitting erroneous information 
to enemy officials.37 For the population to know its role, the government must train and 
inform the people during peacetime through education and preparation documents such as 
Lithuania’s 2015 Prepare to Survive Emergencies and War, or Sweden’s 2018 IF Crisis or 
War Comes.38 These documents describe requirements to stock food, water, clothing, and 
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communications equipment to keep families sustained during a crisis.39 The documents 
also highlight the importance of withstanding information and cyberattacks that may take 
place before armed conflict. The whole population can take actions that enhance crisis 
preparedness and enable average citizens to resist passively.  
For the portion of the population that will actively resist, the resilience phase 
provides the opportunity to build the organization. As highlighted earlier in the military 
discussion, resistance organizations need to be made before conflict and with citizens void 
of official connection to the government and military. Although the Ministry of Defense or 
Interior will likely coordinate the resistance, the regional cells should be made of average 
citizens to prevent adversary use of public records to root out resistance members.40 The 
resistance should have several different components. These components are the 
underground, auxiliary, guerilla, and public components.41 Although not a strict formula, 
these elements listed conduct most active resistance operations and must be built in 
advance of real operations. Highlighting the aspects of the resistance that need construction 
will suffice for the resilience section, and the actual operation of each element will be 
discussed in the resistance section.  
To close the resilience phase of Total Defense, the military, government, and 
civilian population must work together to harden the society against manipulation and 
prepare for war. These actions are necessary to succeed in future conflict but also support 
Total Defense deterrence value. Publicizing elements of preparation such as national unity 
and resistance potential may deter would-be invaders by adding new dimensions of 
resistance not considered by a belligerent.42 Resilience is the starting point for the whole 
society’s defense against invasion. Figure 2 depicts the relationship between resilience and 
resistance. 
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Figure 2. Resilience as the foundation of resolute resistance in national 
defense.43 
2. Resistance Phase 
Where resilience ends, resistance begins. The resistance phase is triggered when a 
foreign power moves against the nation and violates its territorial sovereignty directly or 
by a proxy force.44 Much like the resilience section, this section will discuss actions by 
looking at resistance through the military, government, and population lens. To the credit 
of the resilience phase, resistance builds on the organs that took shape before conflict. The 
military, government, and population now must actively counter foreign aggression in the 
homeland. 
For the military, mobilization and operations begin concurrently with the activation 
of resistance organizations. 45  The traditional military will be executing defensive 
operations where appropriate to confront an invader. For Total Defense discussion, it is 
assumed that the military is insufficient to prevent large-scale attacks by a more powerful 
adversary and must move to participate in the resistance. This assumption is congruent 
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with Total Defense because the policy’s premise is that the nation cannot use pure military 
means to defeat an adversary’s military.  
The traditional state military must actively support resistance operations and 
prepare for the return of friendly forces. Except for military elements moving to 
neighboring countries and preparing to rejoin the fight, like Polish forces during World 
War II, the military plays a supporting role for the resistance.46 The military will help 
subvert an invader by leaving stay behind units or have personnel join resistance elements. 
Close coordination with resistance development before conflict will pay dividends if the 
conventional military force is defeated and demobilized by the invader. Military personnel 
can effectively flow into resistance operations, given the connections and familiarity 
established during the resilience phase. Stay behind units, and some resistance groups will 
likely function as guerillas and be responsible for sabotage, ambushes, raids, and 
harassment of enemy forces. 47  Even forces that leave the country can support the 
resistance by facilitating partner and allied nation support to internal operations against 
occupying powers.48 When the time comes for significant combat against the occupier, 
internal and external military forces will assist liberation operations.49 Regardless of the 
nation’s forces being left behind enemy lines or reorganizing external to the homeland, the 
military will find ways to empower resistance and prepare for the enemy’s eventual 
ejection.  
The civilian government is the next component for discussion in the resistance 
phase. The government has the primary responsibility for leading the nation’s struggle 
against the invaders. Given this responsibility, civilians leaders must direct and coordinate 
the entire operation from resistance to eventual liberation. The government initiates the 
nation’s whole society response and orders the military and resistance organizations to 
mobilize. This mobilization may be challenging to activate, given the varying levels of 
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hostility and aggression employed by the adversary, but the responsibility still rests on 
civilian leaders. 50  As the resistance builds, the government must contribute to the 
movement’s effectiveness by addressing eight critical factors for successful resistance.  
Civilian government leaders have to ensure the resistance organizing entity is 
functioning and effectively creating resistance organizations. 51  It may be incredibly 
difficult to build every component of resistance to perfection, but simply building the 
foundations and initiating planning will provide more capability. Organizations can 
continue to evolve and expand as long as a framework already exists. Second, there needs 
to be a national story and narrative that unites citizens for collective action before, during, 
and after conflict. Third, authorities should communicate purpose and intent for the 
population during resistance. The governments must motivate people to act to the best of 
their abilities. Fourth, the rule of law and political legitimacy needs to continue regardless 
of enemy occupation. 52  The people must trust the government and honor the legal 
structures necessary to continue functioning as a country. Fifth, resistance organizations 
need oversight and control to avoid discrediting the legitimacy of the overall movement. 
Sixth, the whole society must practice collaboration before conflict to build reflexive 
cooperation once resistance begins. Seventh, leaders need to instill agility and adaptability. 
It is impossible to predict the future, and resistance leaders must employ the appropriate 
tactics and processes to account for the occupier’s actions. Lastly, the government should 
practice its continuity contingency plans to hedge against disruptions in governance. The 
government has to anticipate working in exile, establishing shadow governance, and work 
with the diaspora.53 Intergovernmental and international coordination, legal and policy 
establishment, international agreements, and resistance network integration should support 
the legitimate authority’s survival. Regardless of the government’s physical location or the 
degree of foreign occupation, the civilian population will look for leadership and 
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inspiration from its leaders. The eight factors listed above guide government preparation 
and the execution of resistance. Effective government planning will motivate popular 
resistance and maintain hope for national restoration.54  
For Sweden, in the unfortunate event that an invader is not deterred and eventually 
occupies the country, national restoration is the overriding goal of the civilian population, 
and therefore the people will bear the majority of the burden to achieve liberation. 
Resistance carries on against the now occupying force. Assuming the military, government, 
and population collaborates to establish the main components of resistance during the 
resilience phase, four main elements array against the occupying authority: the 
underground, auxiliary, guerilla force, and public component. These four main components 
will define the population’s actions. 
The underground element is responsible for operations in urban territory controlled 
by the adversary’s security forces.55 The underground is involved in political and military-
type operations designed to undermine the occupation force’s actual and perceived control. 
Examples of underground operations include intelligence operations, subversive media 
dissemination, clandestine logistics, sabotage, concealed personnel movement, and 
clandestine medical support.  
The auxiliary comprises ordinary citizens that will clandestinely assist and facilitate 
the underground and guerilla force operations.56 They are part of the overall resistance 
movement but maintain regular behavior patterns to avoid drawing enemy security forces’ 
suspicions.57 It is crucial to consider the auxiliary as part-time participants. They are 
generally proximal to occupiers and assume the most risk due to this exposure. Therefore, 
auxiliary elements only periodically mobilize to support the resistance and must not know 
more than necessary for one’s immediate actions. Examples of auxiliary actions are 
                                                 
54 Fiala, 36. 
55 Fiala, 39. 
56 Fiala, 39. 
57 Fiala, 40. 
24 
logistics procurement, sheltering personnel, transportation, intelligence collection, and 
communications management. Auxiliary members are the links and nodes that join the 
overall resistance movement together.  
Building on the foundation of the underground and auxiliary are the guerilla forces. 
These fighters are the armed component of the resistance and can be military or ordinary 
citizens.58 Guerilla units are smaller, lighter armed, and more flexible than traditional 
military or even police forces. Guerillas will support liberation by conducting raids, 
ambushes, sabotage, and harassment techniques to inflict costs on movements, degrading 
morale, and materially draining the enemy forces. Although guerillas will not look like 
traditional forces, they will still fall under the civilian government’s authority in the Total 
Defense model. Civilian control is essential because the government must continue to focus 
operations toward the overall liberation of sovereign territory. When all resistance elements 
support each other’s efforts, the movement will gain more popular support, increase 
occupation frustrations, and empower the public component to press for liberation. 
Lastly, the population will need a public component to be the people’s overt 
political face and legitimate government.59 If the occupier allows opposition political 
groups to exist, the resistance would have the opportunity to publicly and covertly conduct 
nonviolent and violent acts towards the occupation authority. The public component is 
distinct from the shadow government and even a government in exile in that the adversary 
allows the public functioning of indigenous opposition. If the resistance has no government 
in exile or shadow government, this open political arm of the resistance will be solely 
responsible for negotiating with enemy political authorities and build international support 
for eventual liberation. Understanding that the enemy may find the public component 
intolerable, the resistance’s political role may pass to a shadow government or government 
in exile. Shadow governments must be prepared well in advance of execution since they 
must perform traditional government functions, but they are in occupied territory and 
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demand secrecy for security reasons.60 Whatever governance form takes shape during the 
occupation, the resistance needs political advocates and national direction to keep the 
population, government, and military working collectively to expel the enemy.  
It is worth noting that Sweden does not plan to abandon its conventional military 
during conflict. Sweden continues to invest in high technology weaponry and even 
domestically manufactures its modern fighter jet.61 These weapons are still components of 
the country’s overall defense strategy and combine with TD to deter invasion. It is fair to 
assess TD as an umbrella term for all activities that support national defense.  
Sweden’s Total Defense is separated into resilience and resistance phases. Each 
phase has specific activities that the military, government, and population must perform. 
During resilience, the nation must prepare to resist and harden themselves against nefarious 
external forces. During the resistance, the whole society must resist within the scope of 
every citizen’s responsibility. Total Defense takes average citizens, and turns turn them 
into active subversive deviants. This increases the cost of invasion and occupation. During 
peacetime, TD may deter conflict due to the potential price of intervention. During conflict, 
TD synergizes the people to overthrow their oppressors and restore the homeland. 
3. Policy and Legal Framework 
Total Defense’s legal considerations may seem odd to discuss, but it is important 
because it increases legitimacy and commitment to resistance efforts. Italy created a 
secretive stay-behind force, Gladio, during the Cold War to counter communist invasion 
without an established legal framework.62 Secrecy undermined public support and fueled 
rumors of excessive American influence within the Gladio and Italian Intelligence 
community when the unit’s existence became public. Public distrust of the Gladio makes 
it difficult for Italy to consider establishing another resistance element in the future. 
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Norway also created a similar stay behind unit. Norway’s secretive resistance network was 
called the Rocambole 63  These were mostly unpaid civilians under the leadership of 
military personnel. However, the Rocambole also suffered from problematic legal 
foundations. The unit’s murky legal status undermined trust with the population since the 
people suspected illegal surveillance on other Norwegians. Given the Cold War experience 
of some other European nations, Sweden understood that policy had to match resistance 
capability. 
Sweden’s resistance is legal and a matter of policy. To reinforce Total Defense’s 
credibility, the government passed legislation and makes its intent to oppose invasion 
public knowledge. Sweden wants its citizens and neighbors to know that TD is more than 
a goal; it is the law.64   
Besides reinforcing policy credibility with the population and international 
community, legal foundations give the resistance clear guidance on what is permissible and 
not.65 The legal code outlines the funds, authority to conduct operations, and resistance 
members’ legal status in Sweden. Combined with the country’s TD plans, Swedish 
citizens’ legal justification and guidance reinforce its defense capability.  
B. SINGAPORE TD CONCEPT 
Singapore organizes its Total Defense in six specific pillars. These pillars are 
Psychological Defense, Civil Defense, Social Defense, Economic Defense, Digital 
Defense, and Military Defense.66 
1. Psychological Defense  
Psychological Defense (PD) builds the collective will and commitment for all 
Singaporeans to defend the country. As Singapore’s Ministry of Defense describes it, PD 
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involves instilling patriotism, passion, and pride.67 PD aims to reinforce and enhance 
society’s unity by giving every Singaporean a common cause of security, survival, and 
success. In a broad sense, the government wants its people to have the mental agility to 
confront a crisis with poise and grit. Following the end of the disaster, war, or any other 
crisis, the people must switch one’s mentality to normalcy so the country can rebuild.  
2. Civil Defense 
Civil Defense (CD) involves meeting the population’s essential basic needs as best 
as possible during an emergency.68 CD involves government efforts and participation from 
average citizens to care for one another. Civilians assist the Singapore Civil Defense Force 
with first aid, evacuation, and damage control. During state-sponsored exercises, these 
skills are practiced frequently. 69  The government assumes Singaporean government 
resources will be strained at best and, at worst, depleted despite preparations. 
Consequently, citizens have dual responsibilities. First, the population has to be 
vigilant and report suspicious activity or possible threats. Second, Singaporeans have to 
prepare to care for one another’s essential needs when the city experiences a crisis. The 
population’s ability to cope with any contingency will enhance the country’s efforts to 
succeed in the face of adversity.  
3. Social Defense 
Social Defense (SD) incorporates all citizens, regardless of race or religion, into a 
harmonious society that will assist one another during a crisis.70 During the 1960s, Lee 
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Kuan Yew witnessed widespread ethnic violence in Malaysia.71 Therefore, Lee and the 
government sought to promote harmony among all the different peoples of Singapore. 
Social defense looks beyond the mentality of cohesion and implores the public to act 
harmoniously. The government believes that Singaporeans should befriend other 
Singaporeans and regularly interact to forge close bonds and understanding to reinforce 
societal strength. 72 These actions will mitigate ethnic tensions and help people work 
together during times of stress.  
4. Economic Defense 
Economic Defense (ED) has two components that can be distinguished by short-
term and long-term necessities. In the short term, the government must manage strategic 
resources and reorient civil industry to meet crisis or conflict requirements.73 Government 
management requires preparation and planning that has to take place long before an 
emergency, and therefore the government also has a long-term holistic vision of economic 
defense. The government believes that the economy is instrumental to total defense’s 
success in that it provides the resources to fund defense programs and rebuild following an 
emergency. 74  Additionally, with a long-term perspective in mind, the government 
encourages Singaporeans to maximize their potential and contribute to the country’s 
economic productivity. All citizens are encouraged to pursue education throughout their 
life and adjust their abilities to meet economic needs.75 People are also encouraged to save 
and use environmental resources appropriately. These actions increase economic efficiency 
and output, which in turn enhances the resources available for defense. 
                                                 
71 Ankit Panda, “Singapore: A Small Asian Heavyweight,” Council on Foreign Relations, last 
modified April 16, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/singapore-small-asian-heavyweight. 
72 Singapore Ministry of Defense, “What Is Total Defense?” 
73 Ron Matthews and Nellie Zhang Yan. “Small Country ‘Total Defence’: A Case Study of 
Singapore.” Defence Studies 7, no. 3 (September 2007): 381. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430701559289. 
74 Singapore Ministry of Defense, “What Is Total Defense?” 
75 Singapore Ministry of Defense. 
29 
5. Military Defense  
Military Defense (MD) is, above all, devoted to deterring an aggressor.76 When 
called upon, Singapore’s Armed Forces (SAF) will meet the threat decisively. To keep the 
armed forces focused on defending Singapore, families, employers, and the community 
will support service personnel to keep forces ready to fight.77 Singapore boasts a powerful 
and impressive military composed of National Servicemen and a regular standing force. 
Military defense is also a visible deterrent for a potential aggressor.78 The relatively high 
defense spending and concrete hardware purchases are no secret and signal to an opponent, 
the military capabilities at Singapore’s disposal. The synergistic effect of national and 
defense investment ensures that Singapore’s relatively small force can hit any adversary 
with robust capabilities.  
6. Digital Defense 
Lastly, the newest defense pillar for Singapore is Digital Defense (DD). As an 
interconnected and technologically advanced nation, information systems permeate almost 
every aspect of Singapore’s society.79 Since Singapore’s people enjoy widespread access 
to the internet and so much of the country enjoys the benefits of advanced technological 
infrastructure, Singapore is more susceptible to cyber operations. These operations can 
target the existing digital networks or even Singaporeans themselves. Therefore, the 
government believes that its people are the first line of defense. 80  As articulated on 
Singapore’s Total Defense website, citizens are encouraged to practice proper 
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cybersecurity, be aware of internet scams, and guard against fake news. Combined with 
the population’s vigilance, the government possesses the capabilities to respond to an 
attack and, if necessary, rebuild Singapore’s networks. Singapore realizes its position 
relative to the digital domain and has not ignored its responsibility to adapt to the new 
digital world.  
Singapore’s six pillars of Psychological Defense, Civil Defense, Social Defense, 
Economic Defense, Digital Defense, and Military Defense offer a comprehensive and 
organized concept to build Total Defense.81 The pillars account for the vast and diverse 
sources of national power. Even though Singapore’s armed forces are capable and well-
armed, the small city-state does not rest on its laurels. To ensure any adversary thinks twice 
about offensive action, Singapore is prepared to mobilize all aspects of society to defend 
the homeland.  
7. Policy and Legal Framework 
Upon realizing the city’s vulnerability following the withdrawal of British forces, 
Lee Kuan Yew moved quickly to authorize the creation of a capable defense force and, 
eventually, Total Defense concepts. In 1984, the government introduced TD and 
highlighted the necessity for all Singaporeans to contribute to defense.82 The government’s 
pronouncements made it an official policy for every citizen to contribute in some form or 
fashion. It is essential to publicly declare the nation’s intentions because it signals to its 
people and potential attackers that besides being a duty to defend Singapore, it is also the 
legal duty of all people to support defensive operations. When governments choose to keep 
plans for popular support to the military secret, this runs the risk of alienating and confusing 
average citizens, much like the Norwegian Rocambole and Italian Gladio resistance 
networks during the Cold War. 
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Further, the government made national preparations a normal function of life. 
Regular exercise, online resources, promotional material, media interviews, and countless 
official documents reinforce government, military, and individual responsibilities. 
Singapore’s policy is public, legal, and openly exercised to the point that TD is considered 
an interwoven component of Singaporean civic life.83 Singapore adds credibility to its 
defense options by planning society-wide defense efforts and establishing total defense as 
a policy.  
C. SWEDISH VERSUS SINGAPOREAN TOTAL DEFENSE: 
TAKEAWAYS TO UNDERSTAND TOTAL DEFENSE 
It is apparent that Sweden and Singapore both espouse total defense and share 
similarities, but the actual concepts are somewhat different. Both countries believe that all 
their citizens play crucial roles in the nation’s defense. Still, Sweden envisions some of its 
people actively fighting a guerilla war against the enemy. At the same time, Singapore 
encourages its people to care for one another while the armed forces defend the city. 
Despite this difference, Sweden and Singapore still adhere to one of Total Defense’s 
paramount objectives, incorporating the whole country into defense plans. How each 
country plans to implement the whole-of-society approach depends on both Sweden and 
Singapore’s unique circumstances. Sweden believes protracted guerilla-style combat is 
necessary, and Singapore wants to defend itself by conducting operations forward of the 
city’s territory.84 Despite this difference, both nations require all their citizens to contribute 
to the common defense.  
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IV. TOTAL DEFENSE AND DEFENSE COOPERATION  
A. SWEDEN AND SINGAPORE: INVITING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT  
This paper has so far explained the dilemma small nations face in the world of great 
power competition, proposed total defense policy as a security strategy for smaller 
countries, explained how deterrence and escalation literature relates to total defense and 
described Sweden and Singapore’s Total Defense strategy hinging on societal integration 
in defensive efforts. The paper will now argue that Sweden and Singapore enhance Total 
Defense with foreign security cooperation. Although TD relies on a nation’s domestic 
capability, the policy does not exist in a vacuum. TD and external military assistance are 
complementary. Total Defense enhances the fighting capability of a country and gains time 
for possible external assistance.  
B. INTERVENTION WITHOUT MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATIES 
This paper does not claim to understand all the rationale for non-alignment, but 
some countries prefer to maintain a nominally non-aligned or neutral stance. However, 
even if a country does not have a mutual defense alliance, this does not preclude another 
state from coming to the defender’s rescue. The United States did not have a treaty alliance 
with Kuwait before the Gulf War, and China did not have a defense pact with North Korea 
before the People’s Republic of China (PRC) intervention in the Korean War. The U.S. did 
not make Kuwait an ally until April 1, 2004, and the PRC did not sign the treaties of 
friendship and cooperation with North Korea till the 1960s.85 86 External support to a 
defender is possible without official alliance guarantees.  
Therefore, to improve the likelihood and effectiveness of military support from 
friendly nations, Sweden and Singapore regularly conduct exercises to increase military 
interoperability with friendly nations. This relationship is apparent with Sweden’s 
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cooperation with NATO and Singapore’s cooperation with the U.S. and the Five Powers 
Defense Agreement (FPDA) countries.87 Defense cooperation with other nations opens the 
opportunity for military support during conflict and complements total defense policies.  
C. SWEDEN: NORDIC TOTAL DEFENSE 
Sweden is a sparsely populated Scandinavian country located between Norway and 
Finland. The country is well known for its prosperity, the population’s longevity, and high-
quality social services. What is less known is Sweden’s pragmatic security and foreign 
policy. Sweden is ostensibly neutral and has maintained this moderate stance throughout 
its history. Even during World War II (WW2), Sweden maintained official neutrality.88 As 
the Soviet Union invaded Finland, Sweden declared itself a “non-belligerent.”89 Despite 
its neutrality, Sweden took steps to ensure its safety and security. As Germany invaded 
Norway, Sweden allowed Norwegian refugees and resistance fighters a haven inside 
Swedish territory. 
Conversely, Sweden permitted German troops and transports to sail through 
territorial waters. Sweden also supplied Germany with steel and consumer goods. Sweden 
had to appear neutral to avoid war but also took actions that suited the country’s interests. 
Figure 3 displays Sweden’s neighbors. This trend continues today as Sweden is publicly 
neutral, but the country also secures its sovereignty by implementing total defense and 
increasing partnership with the NATO alliance.90 The long peace Europe enjoys following 
the end of the Cold War has given way to uncertainty, and Sweden has adapted accordingly.  
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Figure 3. Sweden’s regional neighbors.91 
1. Perceived Threat 
Although Sweden enjoys considerable internal stability, Sweden’s regional 
situation is not as stable. The Swedish government publicly acknowledges that armed 
attack and the threat of military invasion is a real possibility.92 Europe’s security situation 
is unstable following Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Ukrainian 
territory in 2014.93 Additionally, Russia continues to increase its military capability far 
beyond the military strength Russia’s immediate neighbors can match. Conversely, the 
Swedish Defense Commission published that Western militaries still do not adequately 
match Russian military preparations.94 Russian President Vladimir Putin seems intent to 
deploy military forces to gain political advantage. Official Swedish government documents 
express concern that even if war breaks out with other European countries, combatants may 
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seize Swedish territory to gain a significant advantage over the other. 95 Since Russia 
continues to degrade the overall security situation in Europe, Sweden cannot expect 
immunity from Moscow’s actions on the continent. Compounding the situation is the 
rivalry between the U.S. and China. China’s military expansion and rising influence will 
draw more U.S. attention and forces to the Asia-pacific.96 When considering Europe’s 
geopolitical situation and the rest of the world, it is evident that Sweden believes Russia is 
an immediate and credible threat. 
2. International Defense Engagement  
Sweden’s defense plans envision total defense efforts gaining time for eventual 
assistance from the NATO alliance.97 Although paradoxical given the nation’s belief in 
neutrality, the Swedish population and government believe that NATO cooperation is 
necessary. Survey data from the 2015 Swedish Society, Opinion, Media (SOM) Institute 
reinforce this paradox since most respondents wanted NATO engagement, but most of the 
population also supported neutrality.98 The paper will not explain this contradiction’s 
roots. Still, it is necessary to mention that Sweden’s policies are nuanced enough to reflect 
the population’s paradoxical beliefs on international defense cooperation.  
The survey results may not be congruent, but it does reflect the Swedish 
government’s decision to increase interoperability with NATO. The Swedish government 
believes that the country needs to defend itself for at least three months to gain enough 
time for NATO.99 Total defense efforts will be the primary internal focus of Swedish 
defense. Assuming that war is inevitable, the government will mobilize the population, 
military, and civil resources to defend the country. As mobilization occurs, Sweden 
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envisions the international community to mobilize its forces to defend or liberate Swedish 
territory from occupation. The Swedish government realizes there is no guarantee of 
assistance. It will take time before a decision comes, but international support would be 
irrelevant without a credible defense because Sweden could already be physically and 
psychologically defeated.100   
Following the end of the Cold War, NATO’s security cooperation with the Nordic 
region manifested itself in Partnership for Peace (PfP) cooperation. 101  Through PfP, 
Sweden enhanced standardization, military planning, training, and exercises with the 
NATO alliance.102 Currently, Sweden continues to engage in staff exercises and numerous 
NATO institutions. Sweden’s military officers are fixtures in the majority of NATO 
headquarters in the Baltic/Nordic region. For example, Sweden has officers in NATO’s 
multinational headquarters in Szczecin, Poland. This facility is not coincidentally 
responsible for planning in the Baltic Sea region.103 NATO and Swedish coordination are 
significant and relevant to Sweden’s deterrence.  
Assuming NATO decided to fight with Sweden in a hypothetical war, prior 
coordination and training facilitate interoperability between NATO and Swedish forces. 
Swedish and NATO cooperation is publicly known and documented. There is no mistake 
that the government wants the security of mutual security pact without a security pact’s 
official label. The government’s actions support this assertion. According to what some 
consider the Swedish “Hultqvist Doctrine,” the aforementioned Swedish Defense 
Minister’s policies demonstrate that Sweden wants to increase defense cooperation and 
enhance international engagement to levels just short of a mutual defense treaty.104 The 
topic has extensive literature and debate that make it impossible for Russian planners to 
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ignore. The gray area manufactured by Swedish policy enables the country to leave the 
door open to foreign assistance while still nominally claiming non-alignment.  
D. SINGAPORE AND THE CITY OF TOTAL DEFENSE 
In the 1800s, the British governor of Bencoolen, located on the west coast of the 
Indonesian Island of Sumatra, wanted to circumvent Dutch trade restrictions in Asia and 
decided to build a port in current-day Singapore.105 The port attracted traders and workers 
from all over Asia. As the trade increased, the population also ballooned, and soon 
Singapore turned from a small island with 1000 inhabitants to a significant city with 85,000 
residents. Figure 4 shows Singapore’s neighbors. Today, Singapore continues to prosper 
from trade with its commanding position at the Malacca Straits’ eastern entrance. Well 
known for its cleanliness and strict adherence to the legal code, it is understandable why 
some might envy Singapore’s safety and prosperity. However, Singapore’s history contains 
trauma that explains why the country is continuously concerned with its national defense.  
                                                 




Figure 4. Singapore’s regional neighbors.106  
1. Perceived Threat 
Singapore has to devote considerable resources and attention to national defense. 
Since Singapore is essentially a large city, defense planners cannot trade space for time. 
Unlike countries such as Russia, Singapore does not have strategic depth and cannot wait 
as the situation develops. This lesson was abundantly clear during World War II when the 
Japanese routed British and Commonwealth forces to seized the Malay peninsula and 
Singapore.107 Once Japan forced the British out of the Malay peninsula, Singapore stood 
little chance of repelling the Japanese Imperial Army. Under Japanese occupation, the 
civilian population suffered inhumane treatment. The older generation of Singapore can 
vividly retell stories of fear, hunger, arbitrary imprisonment, and torture by the Japanese 
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Kenpeitai military police. 108 Eventually, Allied forces defeated Japan, and Singapore 
would gain independence from the British empire in 1965.109 However, Singaporeans 
never forgot World War II lessons and understood that the city-state must defend itself at 
all costs.  
Periodically, Singapore dealt with an unstable and insecure security environment 
in Southeast Asia. Although proud to be independent, Singapore no longer enjoyed formal 
protection from the British military following troops’ withdrawal in 1968.110 The city 
state’s small landmass and relatively small population made Singapore vulnerable without 
British protection. Unfortunately, the troop withdraws took place simultaneously as 
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew believed the country was most vulnerable. In 
Indonesia, General Suharto seized power in a coup. The Vietnam War continued to rage, 
and the region feared continued communist aggression. 
Additionally, Singapore’s predominately Chinese population sits between the 
predominately Muslim states of Indonesia and Malaysia. Both countries have a combined 
population of nearly 300 million people and experienced tension with ethnic Chinese 
populations in the past. 111  When Singapore was still part of Malaysia, Anti-Chinese 
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sentiments erupted into violence in 1964. After Singapore left Malaysia, violence 
continued. In 1969, violent riots occurred again in Malaysia.112 Even more menacing 
towards Singapore during this era was Indonesia’s policy of confrontation.113 On January 
20, 1963, following Indonesian and Malaysian clashes over a revolt in Brunei, Jakarta 
announced its intention to pursue confrontation. Under the “Confrontation” policy, the 
Indonesian military conducted raids in Singapore and Malaysia to subvert and destabilize 
both areas. Given this geopolitical situation, Singapore immediately undertook the 
development of indigenous defense capabilities.114 Indonesia did not change its stance 
until General Suharto replaced Indonesian President Sukarno.115 
Moving to the modern era, Singapore’s relations with its neighbors are stable and 
trend positively, but the region’s uncertain security situation doesn’t allow the country to 
relax.116 One of the main drivers of geopolitical uncertainty in the region is the competition 
between the United States and China.117 As of writing this paper, relations between the 
U.S. and China are incredibly strained. Relations may improve following the election of 
President-elect Joe Biden, but there is no guarantee ties will improve. The paper does not 
claim that China is the only or most pressing security threat to Singapore. Still, given 
Singapore’s proximity to the South China Sea, defense cooperation with Taiwan, the city-
state’s close relationship to the United States, and Singapore’s location in the strategic 
Malacca Straits, there will be friction with Beijing.118 Singapore does not name China as 
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a threat, but there are public disagreements. On November 23, 2017, Hong Kong authorities 
seized Singaporean infantry fighting vehicles en route to Singapore following exercises on 
Taiwan.119 The incident triggered public disagreements regarding Singapore’s continued 
defense cooperation with Taiwan. Fortunately, both sides eventually resolved the issue 
quietly. 
Although Singapore is not a claimant state regarding the South China Sea, 
Singapore does have interests such as freedom of navigation and the rule of law in the 
region. 120  The city-state’s small landmass necessitates open trade lines to ensure 
Singaporeans have access to markets and essential goods necessary for subsistence and 
commerce. 121  The rule of law is essential because Singapore benefits from a stable 
international environment based on rules such as the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Unilateral actions such as China’s declaration of a “9-Dash 
Line” cause tension and contravene agreements such as UNCLOS.122 The issues above, 
combined with the following discussion on Singapore’s international relations, 
demonstrate friction between Singapore and Beijing. The disagreements do not necessitate 
future conflict, but it cannot be written off as impossible. Singapore will not let other 
countries threaten its citizens, and therefore Total Defense combined with foreign defense 
cooperation are critical elements of the country’s defense.  
2. International Defense Engagement  
Singapore’s defense cooperation is similar to Sweden’s cooperation with NATO. 
Singapore maintains substantial defense cooperation with British Commonwealth states 
and the United States.  
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Under the Five Powers Defense Agreements (FPDA), Singapore, Malaysia, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom regularly consult one another on security 
issues and test interoperability during complex multilateral exercises. The exercises 
expanded from land-based defensive exercises to large scale combined and joint maneuvers 
between the five nations.123 If one assumes that exercises reflect the respective nations’ 
security concerns, then it is clear Singapore wants to improve interoperability in the 
maritime and air domains. The May 2010 BERSAMA SHIELD exercise took place over 
the Malay peninsula and the South China Sea while involving 59 aircraft, 19 ships, and 
approximately 2,500 personnel.124 The maneuvers developed interoperability with air, 
ground, and naval units.  
The FPDA helps build cooperation and coordination that supports crisis response 
scenarios. Southeast Asia scholar, Carl Thayer, believes that the FPDA has collateral 
benefits. Thayer writes that “As noted by the UK’s Defence Minister Dr. Liam Fox on 6 
June 2010, the FPDA provided a foundation for member states to work to enhance security 
from assistance to Timor-Leste, natural disaster response, and working together in 
Afghanistan (where Australia, Singapore and Malaysia have made varying military 
commitments.”125 Assuming that the FPDA countries decide to military intervene on each 
other’s behalf in a hypothetical conflict, regular exercises and exchanges increase the 
coalition’s military effectiveness. Any country planning to invade Singapore would have 
to factor in the possibility of external intervention.  
Besides the FDPA, Singapore also maintains close relations with the United States. 
Although Singapore and the U.S. are not allies, the relationship has a wide breadth and 
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deep foundations.126 In the 1960s, both countries fought communist threats.127 Examples 
of the U.S.-Singapore relational strength are apparent when one observes the defense 
acquisitions and basing agreements.  
Singapore can purchase the latest technology and defense systems. For example, 
Singapore received permission to purchase the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.128 The F35 is the 
most advanced fighter aircraft in service, and the only other countries that can procure the 
pricy platform are either a treaty ally or happen to be Israel. Given Singapore’s company, 
it’s evident that the U.S. has enough trust and faith in Singapore to share its air superiority 
fighter. 
Besides defense acquisition, Singapore and the U.S. have basing agreements that 
allow U.S. forces to use Singapore’s facilities. In 2019, Singapore and the U.S. agreed to 
extend the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Regarding United States Use of 
Facilities in Singapore to 2035. The agreement allows the U.S. military to station on 
rotational basis forces such as fighter aircraft, littoral combat ships, and P-8 Poseidon 
reconnaissance aircraft at Singaporean facilities.129     
Although Singapore does not have an explicit agreement to render or receive 
assistance in a hypothetical war, the city-state cooperates with significant military powers. 
The United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia regularly 
cooperate in the defense realm. The FPDA increases interoperability against a wide range 
of security threats, and U.S. partnership decreases the friction associated with moving U.S. 
forces in Singapore. Both actions squarely align Singapore’s defense forces with Western 
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powers and compel any conventional military threat to Singapore to consider the 
consequences of military aggression.130   
E. TOTAL DEFENSE, DEFENSE COOPERATION, AND DETERRENCE 
CREDIBILITY  
Deterrence theorist, Stephen Quackenbush, stated that credible deterrence requires 
the capability to oppose an invader, the attacker perceiving that the defender’s capability 
can cause unacceptable losses, and the defender has the credibility to execute its defensive 
plans.131  If the attacker does not believe the defender will fight, there is no fear of severe 
consequences and no reason to cancel the invasion. Therefore, any nation attempting to 
deter conflict must have the credibility of an existing defense mechanism, the potential for 
such mechanisms to deny an enemy a quick, decisive victory, and the willingness to use it. 
This paper will assume that a quick, decisive victory is acceptable for simplicity of 
argument, but a protracted struggle is unacceptably risky. 
Total Defense societal planning and preparation combined with substantial 
international security cooperation builds capacity and credible resolve to fight. Total 
Defense Policy chapter describes how Sweden and Singapore incorporate the civilian 
population and institutions into overall defense plans. By further reinforcing TD with legal 
status and official policy adoption, citizens are encouraged to join the war effort. The 
current chapter discusses each states’ defense relationship with other powers. Both actions 
epitomize Total Defense’s core belief in employing every facet of a country to defend the 
homeland. Sweden and Singapore synergize military, civil, conventional, and 
unconventional capabilities. If a hypothetical attacker wanted to plan for an invasion, they 
would face conventional military resistance, societal resistance, and possible third-party 
military intervention. A quick, decisive victory may be impossible, and the campaign 
would still require much more planning, preparation, and investment.  
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V. TOTAL DEFENSE ASSESSMENT: VIETNAM AND TAIWAN 
The paper now transitions from countries that maintain Total Defense policies to 
countries that should consider following Sweden and Singapore’s example. The 
hypothetical adversary will be China, and the countries up for discussion are Vietnam and 
Taiwan.  
Vietnam has the distinction of being the last country to face China in full-scale 
combat. From February to March of 1970, Vietnam and China’s war resulted in heavy 
losses and economic disaster without any real change to the strategic situation.132 The war 
erupted when Vietnam invaded China’s ally, Cambodia, and China subsequently invaded 
Vietnam as retribution for attacking Pol Pot’s regime. Today, these two countries maintain 
stable relations but still harbor mutual suspicion. 
Taiwan’s ambiguous sovereignty status and tenuous security situation perpetually 
stress the defense of the island.133 Since 1949, the Communist Chinese government has 
always considered Taiwan an inalienable part of China. But in reality, Taiwan has acted 
independently since the Kuomintang (KMT) fled to the island in 1949. An uneasy 
unofficial, and continuously evolving status quo has maintained peace. As long as Taiwan 
does not move to formal independence, China would not invade the island militarily.134 
To complicate the situation further, the United States reinforces this status quo by deterring 
Chinese Communist Party military intervention and pressuring Taiwan from declaring 
independence. Although unstable and tenuous at times, this framework has prevented wide-
scale military conflict on the island of Taiwan.  
Given the brief introduction of Vietnam and Taiwan’s geopolitical situation, this 
chapter will further explain each nation’s history and current relations with China. 
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Following the China relationship primer, the chapter will evaluate the hypothetical 
adoption of Total Defense, similar to Sweden and Singapore. Societal integration and 
international defense cooperation will be the main components of an effective Total 
Defense.  
A. VIETNAM 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a Southeast Asian nation that brackets the 
South China Sea’s western edge. Vietnam shares mountainous land borders with China to 
the North, Laos and Cambodia to the west, and maritime borders with Thailand, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and China. Over 90 million people enjoy long coastlines, fertile 
coastal plains, and rugged mountains along its western border. 135  Although Vietnam 
enjoys relative peace today, the country’s history has considerable turmoil. From ancient 
times through the 1970s, Vietnam has fought with its neighbors and the world’s great 
powers. 136 Figure 5 displays Vietnam’s neighbors. During ancient times, Vietnamese 
people fought Chinese imperial rule. During the colonial and post-WWII era, the 
Vietnamese fought French rule.137 After the French withdrawal, Vietnamese communists 
would fight the United States during the Vietnam War. Shortly after the Vietnam War, 
Vietnam would invade Cambodia and provoke China to retaliate against Vietnam since Pol 
Pot’s regime allied with China.138 Vietnam has a history of war and fighting. Vietnam’s 
history of conflict makes it easy to understand why national defense is a priority for the 
country. 
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Figure 5. Vietnam’s regional neighbors.139 
1. Perceived Threat 
It is no coincidence that China makes more than one appearance in the history of 
Vietnamese conflict. Chinese and Vietnamese conflict has ancient roots. From 111BC to 
938AD, China dominated the Vietnamese people and territory. 140 Vietnamese people 
resented Chinese domination and consistently revolted to achieve independence. 
Nationalist rebellions took place in 687, 722, 766–791, and 819. Eventually, by 938, 
Vietnamese peasants and elites united to gain independence from the Tang Dynasty.141 
Although Vietnamese and Chinese communist regimes experienced unusually warm ties 
during the mid-20th century struggle against the Western Powers, relations would again 
sour to the point of war. As mentioned several times before, China invaded Vietnam in 
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1979, and both sides experienced significant losses. In the modern era, China and Vietnam 
maintain mostly peaceful but complicated ties. Both countries have yet to ignite another 
war but deal with friction over South China Sea maritime territorial claims. In 2014, the 
Chinese owned Haiyang Shiyou (HYSY) 981 oil rig began oil exploration near the Paracel 
islands across the hypothetical median line between Chinese and Vietnamese maritime 
territory.142 This activity sparked a month’s long clashes that would end up involving over 
60 Vietnamese and 130 Chinese vessels.143 Both sides eventually withdrew, but it was 
clear that Vietnam and China violently disagree on who owns what in the South China Sea. 
Given the history of fighting and current tensions over the SCS, China is the most 
apparent threat to Vietnamese sovereignty and security. China is the most populous country 
globally and has more landmass and resources to exploit than Vietnam could ever tap. 
Additionally, Vietnam lacks strategic depth on the northern border and coastline, which 
means direct interaction with China’s growing military and power projection capabilities. 
This proximity and historical SCS confrontations with China shape the Vietnamese people 
to consider the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) expansion as an existential threat. In 1974, 
China seized the Western Paracel Islands of Duncan, Drummond, and Robert from the then 
Republic of Vietnam.144 Although technically not a provocation against the Communist 
Vietnamese regime, China’s seizure warned of future confrontations. Eventually, 
Communist Vietnam ended up fighting China in March of 1988 over Johnson South 
Reef.145 Two Vietnamese vessels and 64 Vietnamese service members died in the clash. 
When one factors historical conflict and modern clashes over the SCS, it is easy to 
understand why China is the primary existential concern for Vietnam. 
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2. Whole of Society Defense Integration 
A 2016 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)-Yusof Ishak Institute report 
on Vietnam’s security situation stated that “Because of Vietnam’s limited resources, the 
Twelfth National Party Congress decided to keep defence spending to a minimum, and rely 
on the development of an ‘entire-people defence’ strategy instead where every citizen is a 
soldier in the fight against foreign invasion. This strategy is based on a combination of ‘the 
strength of the nation with that of the times,’ defined as the global trend towards peace, 
cooperation, and development which delegitimizes the use of force and aggression.”146  
Additionally, the 2019 Vietnam National Defence Whitepaper expressed the desire 
to “Proactively prevent and repulse enemies’ forms of war and facilitate the conduct of the 
comprehensive, all-people war to be ready to win in all operational environments and 
critical areas.”147 TD is not an alien concept to Vietnamese leaders. The next step would 
involve codifying the public proclamations with plans, regulations, laws, and procedures 
to bring all society components into the fight.  
Given the political desire to integrate the citizenry into national defense, Vietnam 
has specific civil and military capabilities that may serve as building clocks for Total 
Defense. Vietnam has an established system to handle disasters that incorporate all 
government elements. The command system for disaster prevention and control links all 
ministries and sectors under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
direction. 148  Plans are also communicated down to the local government, and these 
governments are expected to formulate locally relevant preparations. Although not an 
explicit objective within Vietnam’s disaster preparation documents, crisis preparations also 
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exercise the same systems that must respond to a human-made crisis such as war. This 
system can serve as the backbone to coordinate government and civilian efforts to support 
the armed forces or mitigate war damage.  
Vietnam’s disaster response system also incorporates the military. If military 
assistance is required during a disaster, the Vietnam National Committee for Search and 
Rescue (VINASARCOM) will communicate directly with the Ministry of Defense for 
material and capability assistance.149 For example, if the air force must execute rescue 
operations, VINASARCOM requests it from MOD, and the MOD directs the execution. 
During serious conflict, it is reasonable to believe that experience coordinating civilian and 
military capabilities will facilitate the same type of coordination necessary to handle an 
outbreak of violence. Exercising civil-military coordination in peacetime is better than 
building civil-military coordination while under attack. 
Additionally, should Vietnamese leaders plan to organize the population into a 
fighting force, Vietnam can build on its Militia and Self-Defense force (SDF) to fight 
aggression within its borders. Owing its heritage to units established to fight the French, 
American, and South Vietnamese regimes, the Militia and SDF is the “mass armed force 
not detached from production and work, protecting local CPV’s organizations, authorities, 
lives and property of people, public property, standing ready to fight, fighting and 
providing combat support, and playing the role as the core force together with the entire 
people in fighting against the enemies in their localities and workplaces.” 150  These 
elements also practice in peacetime search and rescue, pandemic defense, natural disaster 
response, and ensuring national security. In an invasion scenario, the Militia and SDF make 
the ideal guerilla force given their military training and local knowledge. The Vietnamese 
regime realizes these elements’ potential and plans to enhance Militia and SDF capabilities 
with advanced modern weapons.151 This element will be an additional layer of defense 
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and complement the conventional force capabilities of the Vietnamese People’s Army 
(VPA). The Militia and SDF will work with the VPA in any conflict scenario.152 
Vietnam’s government wants its citizens integrated into the nation’s defense, and 
the country has various elements that may become critical components of a whole-of-
nation defense strategy. These two factors indicate that Hanoi may be initiating a concerted 
effort to plan and organize its government, citizenry, and military in a mutually supporting 
defense strategy similar to Sweden or Singapore.  
3. International Defense Cooperation 
Hanoi’s international defense cooperation enables the country to procure high-
technology weapon systems and expand defense engagement with other nations. TD 
integrates all the resources of the state, and this includes traditional military power. 
Similarly, but not to the same extent as US-Singapore defense cooperation, Vietnam has 
strong defense ties with Russia. Dating back to the Cold War, Hanoi and Moscow have 
significant experience working with one another.153 This relationship has enabled Hanoi 
to procure defensive capabilities. In 2016 alone, Vietnam spent $5.0 billion on its 
defense.154 There are currently six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines in the Vietnamese 
Navy. 155  Although vastly outnumbered by the PLA Navy, the Kilos are likely a 
consideration for PLA planners. Besides submarines, Vietnam agreed to build anti-ship 
missiles in cooperation with Russia. 156  With Russia’s Federal Service for Military-
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Technical Cooperation, Vietnam will jointly manufacture the Uran Switchblade missile. 
The production capacity will enhance Vietnam’s ability to counter a naval attack. 
Concerning air defenses, Vietnam sports some of the most advanced systems globally, 
thanks to Russia. In 2003, Russia agreed to sell Vietnam the S-300 PMU surface to air 
missile system.157 The missiles enable Vietnam to guard its air space out to 150km.  
Weapons system cooperation and procurement from Russia serves as an example 
of Vietnam’s international defense cooperation. In February of 2020, Vietnamese and 
Russian Defense ministers signed an agreement to “bolster defense cooperation on the 
basis of mutual political trust and the signed deals.”158 To be clear, the cooperation is not 
a mutual security pact, but defense procurement improves Vietnam’s defense toolkit and 
establishes an avenue for Russian and Vietnamese interoperability. Regardless of how 
unlikely it is for Russia to intervene on Vietnam’s behalf against China, if Moscow 
hypothetically decided to help Hanoi, the two countries would have more familiarity and 
interoperability than if both sides had no interaction. Additionally, given Russia and 
China’s history of border skirmishes during the Cold War, both countries may experience 
tension over their extensive common border in the future.159 If Beijing manages to threaten 
Hanoi and core Russian interests, China may fight both Vietnam and Russia.  
In addition to arms sales and cooperation with Russia, Vietnam plans to expand its 
defense interaction with other countries and institutions. Vietnam’s 2019 Defense White 
Paper concluded that,  
transparency of the national defense policy, aimed at promoting mutual 
understanding and confidence-building between the CPA and Vietnamese 
people and militaries and people around the world, facilitating the 
improvement of effectiveness of international integration and defence 
cooperation between Viet Nam and other countries as well as regional and 
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international organisations to deal with emerging security issues for the sake 
of peace, stability, cooperation, and development.”160  
Hanoi wants to increase defense engagement. Although there is no mention of 
mutual defense or alliances, Vietnam may follow the same path as Singapore and Sweden. 
Both countries claim non-alignment but practice deep defense cooperation with other 
nations. For instance, Vietnam and the United States may continue to grow security 
cooperation. In July of 2013, President Barack Obama and Vietnamese President Truong 
Tan Sang signed an agreement to “deepen mutual relations” in defense and security 
areas.161 Additionally, Vietnam’s decision to use language such as Indo-Pacific Strategy 
in its defense white paper is a nod to the region’s Trump administration’s characterization 
and a subtle signal of support for U.S. policy.162 Vietnam also recently hosted the first 
U.S. Aircraft Carrier since the Vietnam War.163 
Although Vietnam’s relationship with Russia and the United States are not mutual 
security pacts, nor will it ever be one, if Vietnam desires enhanced cooperation, deliberate 
long-term engagement can turn Hanoi’s relationship to Russia or the U.S. similar to 
Sweden’s relationship with NATO Singapore’s interaction in the FDPA. Realistically, both 
Sweden and Singapore methodically enhanced defense engagement over decades. Such 
development requires immense effort and time to expand. These relationships are unlikely 
to emerge in the near or mid future but may take shape over many years of engagement. If 
that scenario occurs, Beijing might consider if either country would militarily support 
Vietnam in a hypothetical war.  
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What is clear is that Vietnam has substantive security cooperation with international 
partners such as Russia and the United States. Pair external support with a unified national 
defense effort, and Vietnam has the components necessary to enhance a Total Defense 
strategy.  
4. Total Defense Assessment: Vietnam  
Vietnam has the potential and political desire to grow social, civil, and military 
defense integration. As a TD developing country, Vietnam’s policy needs to mature. The 
Vietnamese government would need to match civic preparation, legal guidance, and 
tangible widespread integration seen in Sweden and Singapore. Vietnam certainly has the 
potential to harness the energy of the people. During Vietnamese and Chinese clashes in 
the South China Sea in 2014, Vietnamese people organized protests and even attack 
perceived Chinese factories.164 Suppose CPV provides more guidance and planning for 
TD. In that case, the government could channel anti-Chinese sentiments into crisis 
preparedness exercises or national defense drills, which provide more utility than rioting 
or looting.  
Concerning international defense cooperation, Vietnam has significant engagement 
and arms sales relationship with Russia but not on the same level as Sweden with NATO, 
Singapore with the U.S. and FPDA countries, or even Taiwan with the U.S. Sweden, 
Singapore, and Taiwan can envision situations where they would have other countries 
fighting alongside them. Vietnam does not have anything close to a budding defense pact. 
Currently, Hanoi’s middle road foreign policy helps the country avoid entanglement in 
more considerable geopolitical competition. Vietnam takes a measured approach to 
international cooperation to avoid picking sides in geopolitical competition. This moderate 
policy demonstrates Vietnam’s “3 Nos.” Vietnam will not have a military alliance, will not 
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side with one country over another, and will not have foreign bases on Vietnam’s 
territory.165   
However, Vietnam’s 3 Nos policy does not cut off all forms of defense cooperation 
and still allow the type of engagement necessary to complement TD. Sweden and 
Singapore do not technically have mutual defense treaties with other countries. Still, both 
have security cooperation deep and broad enough to improve interoperability, facilitating 
hypothetical military intervention. Vietnam had already expressed a desire to deepen 
security cooperation and demonstrated this desire when Hanoi conducted joint naval 
exercises in the South China Sea with the Indian Navy.166 
Vietnam’s societal preparations and cooperation with foreign militaries exist as a 
foundation for further development. Hanoi does not have the developed TD policies 
exercised in Sweden but may already be moving in that direction.  
B. TAIWAN 
The island of Taiwan sits over 200 miles off mainland China and is home to over 
23 million people.167 Sitting between Japan and the Philippines, Taiwan sits along the 
western approaches to some of China’s east coast. Figure 6 shows Taiwan’s neighbors. 
Taiwan’s population comprises native Taiwanese people and Han Chinese people who 
immigrated to the island. As Taiwanese citizens, the people enjoy the benefits of 
democracy, much like other liberal democracies.168 The people have a voice in the affairs 
of the island and regularly vote in new governments. Economically, the island and its 
people are prosperous and continue to be leaders in semiconductor manufacturing. A 
Taiwanese company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd, is the world’s largest 
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chip manufacturer. Taiwan also sports a per capita net worth of $147,931.169 By many 
measures, the island of Taiwan seems like a well-run democratic nation. However, despite 
Taiwan’s peaceful and prosperous appearance, the geopolitical struggle for recognition and 
independence from the PRC makes the island a dangerous flashpoint for conflict. For 
decades, an uneasy peace allowed the PRC and Taiwan to exist without full-scale war. Still, 
with Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” demanding Taiwan people accept Beijing’s vision of 
“one country, two systems,” relations are unstable.170 It is difficult for Taiwan’s leadership 
and citizenry to trust Beijing, given the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) inconsistent 
and brutish application of the “one country, two systems” policy in Hong Kong.171  These 
are uncertain times for the security of Taiwan. 
 
Figure 6. Taiwan’s regional neighbor.172 
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1. Perceived Threat 
Ever since the Kuomintang (KMT) government left mainland China and 
established itself on the island of Taiwan, the status of the island of Taiwan has been 
contentious. To the PRC, Taiwan is inextricably a part of China, and Taiwan’s separation 
from the mainland is artificial.173 Beijing has always reserved the right to use violent force 
to reunify the island. Taiwan’s authorities would counter that the democratically elected 
government and free people on the island deserve respect, much like the other official 
countries recognized by the international community. This disagreement has its roots in the 
fallout from the Chinese Civil War from 1945–1949. 174  Following the Communist 
Chinese victory against Nationalist Chinese forces on mainland China, on October 1st, 
1949, Mao declared the PRC’s formation.175 Simultaneously, the KMT established itself 
on Taiwan and pledged somewhat unrealistically to retake mainland China and assert itself 
as China’s legitimate government.176 Both sides view the status quo differently.  
Given the conflict over Taiwan’s status, PRC leaders reserve the right to retake the 
island violently. In 2004, Beijing adopted an “Anti-Secession Law” that states,  
If the separatist forces of “Taiwan independence” use any name or any 
means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s separation from China, or a major 
incident occurs that would lead to Taiwan’s separation from China, or the 
possibilities of peaceful unification are completely exhausted, the country 
may adopt non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to safeguard 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity.177  
More recently, in January 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping made it abundantly 
clear that “Taiwan must accept Beijing’s preferred one country two systems model for 
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reunification, or face the military consequences.”178 Beijing does not recognize Taiwan as 
an independent country and consistently threatens war if peaceful reunification is 
impossible. This threat makes it very clear to the leaders and people of Taiwan that China 
will not accept the nation’s current status for perpetuity. War with China is an explicit 
threat that requires concrete action. Many believe that Taiwan has to defend itself for two 
to four weeks before enough forces are ready to begin operations to support Taiwan.179 
Taiwan’s response is the island’s Total Defense brand called All-Out Defense (AOD) and 
international defense engagement. 180 Championed by former President Lee Tung-hui, 
initially as “All-out Defense Consciousness” in 1996, Lee wanted to make sure the 
population understood the island’s security challenges and that the population would do 
everything possible to support defensive operations.181 
2. Whole of Society Defense Integration 
The government of Taiwan has initiated programs to prepare the population to 
integrate into homeland defense. Under the AOD banner, the Political Warfare Bureau 
hosts summer fight camps to teach average citizens the skills necessary to resist an 
invasion. 182  Participants are taken to various locations such as Kinmen or Matzu to 
participate in military-style training that teaches participants to shoot, climb, use ropes, 
employ camouflage, and other activities to impart fighting skills. 183 The Ministry of 
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Defense believes that these summer camps increase participants’ capability and willingness 
to fight for the country. Before attending camp, 82.1% expressed willingness to join the 
nation’s defense.184 After attending the camp, the percentage increased to 93.99%. The 
camps demonstrate that Taiwan has taken steps to motivate the population to defend the 
country and teach the skills necessary to frustrate an invasion. 
Another example of Taiwan’s societal defense integration is the education system. 
The government passed the All-out Defense Education Act in 2000, which specifies the 
requirement to educate citizens on various components of AOD.185 186 In conjunction 
with the Ministry of Education, high school students learn military skills and acquire 
shooting experience. The education program also promotes civil-military interaction 
through guided tours that showcase the military’s readiness to defend the island.187 Both 
summer camps and AOD education are examples of Taipei’s investment in civil defense 
and the mustering of popular support to defend the home island.  
Lastly, AOD’s reach in society is codified in Taiwanese law. In 2000, the 
Taiwanese legislature passed the National Defense Law and the Organization Law of the 
Ministry of Nation Defense. 188  The legislation passed AOD as the guiding defense 
concept. AOD would incorporate political, economic, psychological, technological, and 
other societal components to directly or indirectly support that island’s defense. 
Additionally, the laws established the framework for military and civil sector cooperation. 
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President Lee wanted to ensure that the armed forces and civil society could organize the 
entire society to maximize its defense potential.189    
Taiwan wants popular support and participation in defense activities. Establishing 
military training for civilians outside of military service and integrating military skills in 
the education system indicates that civilian integration in the island’s defense is necessary. 
Increasing the citizenry’s fighting potential and setting legal foundations for AOD 
maximize the island’s ground forces’ resistance potential. Increasing potential resistance 
makes sense when one remembers that Taiwan has to forestall invasion for at least two to 
four weeks. If Taiwan’s conventional military capabilities fail to prevent PRC troop 
landings on the island, AOD’s popular mobilization adds another defense layer to frustrate 
a hypothetical People’s Liberation Army invasion. Military training camps, military 
education, irregular warfare preparations, and legal codification are examples of AOD’s 
whole-of-society approach to defense, which helps increase the population’s fighting 
potential and realizes President Lee’s vision of a unified, motivated population zealously 
defending the island.  
3. International Defense Cooperation 
Although Taiwan is not officially recognized as a sovereign state by most of the 
world, it maintains close ties with the United States. The U.S. is the most critical defense 
partner for Taiwan because the U.S. provides Taiwan advanced weaponry and potentially 
stands ready to fight with Taiwan should Beijing force reunification. This relationship 
stems from the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In 1979, the U.S. Congress passed the TRA 
and ensured the U.S. kept security ties with Taiwan following US-PRC relations’ 
formalization.190 The TRA has three main requirements. First, any reunification of Taiwan 
must be peaceful, or else it becomes a grave issue for the U.S. and the Western Pacific. 
Secondly, the U.S. must provide Taiwan with weapons for defensive purposes. Third, the 
U.S. has to keep the capability to confront any coercion or lethal plan that threatens the 
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security, society, economy, or population of Taiwan. 191  The TRA’s tenets cement 
Taiwan’s defense engagement with the U.S. and leave open the possibility of U.S. 
intervention in a Taiwan Strait war.  
Through the U.S., Taiwan can purchase the weapons necessary to deter and forestall 
an invasion. For decades, the Taiwanese military has procured advanced weaponry such as 
the AH-64E Apache attack helicopter and F-16 Falcon fighter jet.192 Although Beijing’s 
forces outnumber Taipei’s, these systems can inflict significant damage to an invasion 
force. Assuming the U.S. decided to fight for Taiwan, the island would have to gain time 
to enable U.S. forces to mobilize. Therefore, arms sales are necessary for Taiwan and the 
U.S. to counter PRC aggression. 
About U.S. intervention, this is the most crucial part of Taiwan-US defense 
engagement because it deters PRC invasion. To be clear, the TRA does not guarantee U.S. 
intervention under any circumstance, but the legislation alludes to the U.S. resolve to 
defend Taiwan. Former Secretary of State James Baker explained the situation in that,  
if we said we would come to the defense of Taiwan under any and all 
circumstances, she would declare independence and China would move—
no doubt about that in my mind. If we said we wouldn’t China would move. 
And so we shouldn’t say under what circumstances and to what extent we 
will aid Taiwan, but we should make it clear that we would view with the 
gravest concern any resort to the use of force.193 
Consequently, the U.S. can decide to intervene or not, depending on the context of 
a hypothetical clash between Taiwan and China. The key takeaway is that Taiwan’s 
defense engagement with the U.S. affords Taiwan weapons and possible security 
guarantees. Taiwan’s AOD combined with US-supplied weapon systems buy time for U.S. 
intervention and ultimately deter PRC violent reunification with Taiwan.  
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4. Total Defense Assessment: Taiwan  
It is clear Taiwan already has TD established in its All-out Defense policy. It is fair 
to say that Taiwan’s AOD makes the island an official TD practitioner. The government 
has AOD enshrined in the island’s defense policy and has formalized civil-military 
coordination. Taipei publishes literature, offers training camps, and integrated military 
education into overall education. These policies demonstrate substantive societal 
integration and planning in support of homeland defense. 
Additionally, Taiwan’s defense cooperation invites external military support. The 
TRA guides Taipei’s relationship with Washington and obligates the U.S. to arm Taiwan 
with defensive weaponry while also mentioning U.S. military intervention should Beijing 
unilaterally force reunification. Although U.S. intervention is far from certain, arms sales 
and ambiguity about U.S. support are enough to meet this paper’s standard for international 
defense cooperation.  
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VI. U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. VIETNAM 
Vietnamese intentions to move toward Total Defense creates considerable 
opportunities for defense cooperation with the United States, but the engagement must 
account for China’s sensitivities toward Vietnam. Hanoi does not want to pick sides and 
become a pawn for more powerful nations.194 Unless Beijing provokes conflict, Vietnam 
still prefers to avoid antagonizing China. Given these constraints, the United States should 
facilitate security cooperation through other countries and supporting non-traditional 
security issues. 
The U.S. can facilitate Total Defense cooperation through countries such as Sweden 
and Singapore. In February of 2020, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) 
hosted the Trans-Regional Working Group (TRWG) at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, CA. The event brought together participants from Sweden, Norway, Finland, 
and many other countries to discuss Total Defense policies.195 If Vietnamese leaders 
decided to enhance cooperation with the U.S., the TRWG would be an opportunity to begin 
a dialog. The TRWG could enhance Vietnamese efforts without drawing the same scrutiny 
associated with purely bilateral cooperation. If Sweden manages the discussions of TD 
while the U.S. takes a secondary role, Vietnam could accelerate TD development and 
enhance defense cooperation without prompting the PRC to counter vehemently. 
Additionally, U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) can host events that bring 
together international irregular warfare practitioners. Given the constantly changing nature 
of modern combat, all participants can learn about other nations’ irregular warfare 
experiences. Irregular warfare concepts can help a population prepare and plan disruptive 
activities against an aggressor. These events can expand dialog on how to employ military 
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or civil capability asymmetrically. Given Vietnam’s history of guerilla warfare and 
resistance against external powers, it is likely Vietnam has considerable experience to share 
with other nations attempting to counter larger neighbors asymmetrically.  
Additionally, non-traditional security engagements with the U.S. should be 
supported in a manner that creates asymmetric capability. Vietnam is already comfortable 
with maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, and disaster response engagements.196 
These topics are less provocative to China and span civil-military capabilities that still 
support crisis response. 197  Assuming Vietnam tailor’s it’s cooperation requests with 
asymmetric development in mind, the U.S. should be responsive to requests with an 
understanding that Vietnam will use the engagement to enhance its options to counter 
threats irregularly. Pacific Partnership or Pacific Angel engagements can be tailored to 
encompass more non-traditional security issues that Vietnam believes are necessary to 
increase irregular options.198 It is important to be responsive and not prescriptive. The U.S. 
should let Vietnam decide what is important and assist development. This type of 
interaction can enhance Hanoi’s maritime proficiency without overtly signaling plans to 
militarize the maritime domain any more than it already is. Even if Vietnam does not have 
irregular capability in mind, the U.S. should still facilitate improvements in medical skills 
and capabilities necessary to handle crises. Medical projects, medical exchanges, and first 
responder courses could improve societal resilience. Like Singapore’s civil defense 
concept, the U.S. can help Vietnamese people care for one another during natural or 
manmade crises. If the Vietnamese people can become more resilient and independent, 
Hanoi can free up resources and manpower to focus on combat operations.  
B. TAIWAN 
Since Taiwan already has an AOD policy and substantial defense engagement with 
the U.S., one way for the U.S. to improve Taiwan’s AOD is to balance conventional and 
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unconventional resistance efforts. This balancing entails weapons acquisitions and 
resistance planning. It is unlikely that Taiwan will stop acquiring advanced weaponry from 
the United States. Still, the U.S. can support Taiwan’s AOD by selling systems that have 
conventional and unconventional fighting applications. For example, for the price of one 
fighter jet, Taiwan could acquire considerably more man-portable (MANPAD) surface-to-
air (SAM) missiles, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), and sea mines. Although Taiwan 
already possesses Stingers MANPADs, TOW-2B ATGM, and Javelin ATGMs, Taipei 
could procure even more and stockpile enough weaponry to arm substantial proportions of 
its population.199 If the PLA managed to land on the island and make its way to Taipei, 
Taiwanese forces could employ such systems to stymy progress in a fashion similar to 
Chechen attacks on Russian forces in the First Chechen War. During this conflict, by 
targeting enemy vehicles in urban terrain, Chechen fighters inflicted heavy casualties 
against motorized and mechanized forces as Russian troops attempted to seize the city of 
Grozny.200  
Regarding resistance planning, the U.S. should increase USSOF engagement with 
Taiwan counterparts to devise and understand asymmetric plans for resistance. Taiwan’s 
leaders likely have plans and preparations to fight the PLA irregularly. However, if USSOF 
can understand and assist planning, it opens opportunities to influence weapons acquisition 
and military exchanges to meet Taiwan’s unconventional fighting requirements. 
Additionally, USSOF has Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations elements that can 
advise Taiwan on employing civil capabilities to support its defense. Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations exchanges may also help the U.S. understand AOD concepts that 
could help other nations build civil-military components of TD policies.  
By supporting Taiwan’s AOD policy with applicable weapons acquisition and 
cooperative asymmetric warfare planning, the U.S. can help Taiwan resist PRC aggression, 
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buy time for U.S. leaders to decide on military intervention, and allow U.S. forces to 
mobilize to assist Taiwan. 
69 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Great power competition involves more than just the great powers. Some countries 
and nations must defend themselves from larger adversaries. Sweden and Singapore 
decided to employ Total Defense to deter an attacker and resist an offensive. Vietnam and 
Taiwan can take lessons from Sweden and Singapore to shape the development of TD. This 
paper argues that Sweden and Singapore have effective TD policies because both countries 
legitimately integrate the whole society into defense plans and international court 
assistance by maintaining deep security cooperation with other countries. These tenets are 
the basis of evaluation for Vietnamese and Taiwanese TD efforts.  
Vietnam’s leaders have publicly stated the government’s desire to build an “All-
peoples” defense policy, which is essential Total Defense.201 The country has the desire 
to build TD and seeks to diversify Vietnam’s defense cooperation. If the CPV decides that 
Vietnam must push TD and deeper defense cooperation, Hanoi can mature its All-peoples 
Defense and deter conflict.  
The island already has a comprehensive, all-encompassing defense strategy in the 
island’s All-out Defense policy for Taiwan. The AOD policy incorporates average citizens 
into defense preparations and has legislation that supports AOD implementation in 
education. Taiwan also has significant international assistance in the form of U.S. defense 
cooperation. The U.S. passed TRA offers Taiwan the weapons necessary for defense and 
the implicit possibility of military intervention. Taiwan has civil integration and 
international defense cooperation on the same order of magnitude as Sweden and 
Singapore.  
For Washington policymakers, the U.S. can assist Vietnamese and Taiwanese TD 
efforts. By supporting Hanoi and Taipei, the U.S. benefits by empowering Vietnam and 
Taiwan to deter Chinese aggression with internal capabilities. Should deterrence fail, TD 
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can delay PRC invasion and buy time for the international community to decide on 
assistance and possibly mobilize to protect both nations.  
This paper adopted the term “Poison Shrimp” from Singapore’s past perception of 
its defensive capabilities. Although the characterization has changed for Singapore, the 
metaphor of a poison shrimp helps conceptualize TD. A poison shrimp may appear 
vulnerable, but its organic poison serves as a deterrent to predators. Yet, the poison is 
worthless if the predator doesn’t know the shrimp is deadly, and therefore the shrimp 
signals its lethality with bold colors. If the fish decides to eat the shrimp anyway and 
somehow survives, the fish would be weaker and vulnerable to other hungry predators. In 
geopolitical terms, nations that practice Total Defense publicly espouse determined united 
resistance to dissuade possible aggressors. Even if the aggressor decides to invade, stiff 
resistance will weaken the attacker. TD is the poison for any invader. Once an invader is 
weak, the defender’s prior defense cooperation invites other countries to fight the wounded 
attacker. The third-party countries are additional predators. Any great or regional power 
should note the perils of war with a Total Defense practitioner.   
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